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Although the democratization of Serbia is a key precondition for creating long-term security in the Western 
Balkans, progress has been far too slow since the ousting of the Milosevic regime. Recent social and political 
developments indicate that it will be difﬁcult in the near future to maintain strong support for regionalism,
minority rights and democratization. According to recent opinion polls, the Serbian Radical Party enjoys the 
highest popularity and Serbia responded with resentment to Montenegro’s recent proclamation of independ-
ence.  Moreover, as crucial decisions will be taken before the end of this year regarding the status of Kosovo, 
the political climate may well not be conducive to fostering pro-minority attitudes in Serbian society. No one 
knows what will be the response to Kosovo’s eventual independence, yet, internal reaction in Serbia remains 
one of the most critical sources of insecurity for the region. As Kosovo moves towards independence, the Al-
banians in Southern Serbia will very likely remain a source of tension and potential conﬂict even if, at present,
they seem unlikely to take up weapons to join Kosovo.
At this delicate time some ethnic minorities have articulated new demands including an increasing call for ter-
ritorial solutions. The Albanians in Southern Serbia, for example, began to require decentralization and territo-
rial autonomy similar to what Belgrade seeks for Kosovo Serbs.  Amidst an escalation of inter-ethnic tensions 
in Vojvodina, the Hungarian minority once again put forward their proposal for greater autonomy including 
territorial autonomy. The incidents targeting ethnic minorities in Vojvodina raised concerns not only in neigh-
boring Hungary, but prompted reactions from European institutions, such as the European Parliament. A third 
example is the Sandzak Muslims who, at the end of 2005, gave voice to their grievances. Three Bosniak parties 
issued a declaration claiming that their human and minority rights were being violated, and thus called for the 
creation of Sandzak region as a political-territorial unit. 
Although minorities may be putting the issue of ethnic-territorial autonomy even more vocally, in light of the 
present political mood in Serbia, a positive reception and support for such demands is very unlikely. According 
to the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia2,  the minority issue has become marginalized with the 
result that it only gains international attention when it becomes a security issue. Despite this, grievances of 
ethnic minorities do remain a potential source of insecurity. As a result of discrimination during the Milosevic 
regime, ethnic minorities were under-represented in public institutions and in the management of those com-
panies that were privatized. The integration of Albanians into state institutions such as the courts, the judici-
ary, postal services, tax authorities, land registry, local development agencies, etc. has been very slow or non 
existent since the adoption of the Covic Plan in 2001. Among the various speciﬁc problems, the issue of educa-
tion curricula can be mentioned, as minority syllabi do not tend to reﬂect the history and culture of minorities,
but favor Serbian tradition and culture. Providing adequate institutional mechanisms to solve such problems 
and thus reduce ethnic tensions is a precondition for stability not only in Serbia but in the whole region. 
The Serbian government is presently preparing a new constitution, and the issue of how to create regional 
structure for the country is one of the most contested topics. While creating new regions might provide an 
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opportunity for ethnic gerrymandering by dividing the compact blocks of Hungarians in Vojvodina or of the 
Muslims in Sandzak, for example, decentralization through empowering local governments might turn out to 
be a better long lasting solution. The decentralization of Serbia through the delegation of more authority to 
municipalities could beneﬁt minority groups, especially when the latter constitutes a local majority. This idea
has been promoted also by the Council of Europe, which in a recommendation given in 2001 to the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia, connected decentralization to the situation of ethnic minorities. The recommenda-
tion stated that “broad decentralization will help respond to the legitimate expectations of the minorities in 
Vojvodina and Sandzak, and of the Bulgarian and Albanian minorities (Presevo Valley).” It further suggested 
“that the debate on regionalization in Serbia should also focus on the structures that might be proposed to the 
regions with large minorities.” 3
While admitting that meeting demands for minority rights requires more than simply decentralization, this may 
well be more than a simple and practical step in that direction for those minorities that are more numerous and 
live in concentrated areas. Furthermore, granting more substantial authority to local self-governments could 
pre-empt various current claims for territorial autonomy. Bestowing local governments with more autonomy 
may be welcomed by most municipalities, as most complain about the centralized nature of the state in Ser-
bia. Raising the issue of decentralization with a focus on municipalities would also be politically less sensitive 
than pressing demands for more minority rights or the creation of ethnic regions. Decentralization can be an 
“ethnically blind” uniform measure. Finally, decentralization can be viewed as something desirable per se; it 
“will strengthen democracy, citizen participation and the quality of public services while generally contribut-
ing to national cohesion”.4  According to the evaluation of the Council of Europe, there is plenty of room for 
improvement for ensuring real autonomy for local-governments in Serbia, yet, this is not so much a matter of 
their legal status. Local authorities cannot be substantially reformed merely through new legal in theory many 
self-governments have wide powers, in practice, many of these powers are absent. Real responsibility should 
be transferred from the center to the local level, including not only legal powers, but also ﬁnancial resources
and administrative backing. 
Whilst it would undoubtedly strengthen the power of municipalities, implement-ing genuine provincial self-
government for Vojvodina was also recommended by the Council of Europe, which would be very welcome by 
ethnic minorities. Leaders of the Hungarian minority support Vojvodina’s autonomy because – among other 
reasons – they see the province as a better guarantor of minority rights than the Serbian state.
However, probably the most important reason why empowering local governments would be favorable for 
minorities is that many of their grievances are related to everyday life-concerns. It is somewhat worrying that 
in Presevo during the 2004 local elections the most radical nationalist Ragmi Mustafa’s Democratic Party of 
Albanians  (PDSH) came out as strongest, also taking over the mayor’s ofﬁce in 2005. According to analysts,5 
this was a result of popular dissatisfaction with economic hardships (local ofﬁcials estimate that unemployment
is around 70 per cent) and the moderates’ failure to achieve progress. In Bujanovac, the result of decades 
of discrimination is that over 90 per cent of those employed in the public sector are Serbs. Clearly, tackling 
people’s everyday concerns would be crucial to gaining their loyalty for the Serbian state and to convince them 
to abandon the idea of creating Eastern Kosovo. Southern Serbia and Sandzak are the most economically de-
pressed regions of Serbia, and unemployment is especially high among the young male population. The Law 
on Investment Planning in Serbia until 2010 does not mention a single major investment in Sandzak. If local 
authorities gained substantial ﬁscal autonomy – which they lack at the moment – they could possibly improve
the quality of public services and could also counter-balance the ethnic bias of countrywide policies. In ad-
dition, having multi-ethnic local police forces could ease tensions not only in Southern Serbia but in Sandzak 
and Vojvodina as well, as such police bodies would probably more effectively respond to incidents committed 
against members belonging to ethnic minorities. Empowering local governments could be a way to ﬁnd better
solutions to such issues.
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While delegating more authority to the local level might improve local economic development and greater in-
tegration of minorities, some measures should also be adopted to foster local democracy. Recent experiences 
suggest that sometimes minorities discriminate against individuals belonging to the majority living in their 
midst as an actual minority. The last few years Serbs have started to leave Presevo and Bujanovac in growing 
numbers due to such perceived discrimination. Therefore, institutions and procedures should be put in place 
to raise the level of citizen initiative, foster consensus between ethnic communities and guarantee equal op-
portunities for and treatment of citizens regardless of ethnicity.
In April 2005, the EU began to negotiate a Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) with Serbia and Mon-
tenegro. Until the EU upholds the prospect of future membership for Serbia, it has considerable leverage to 
push forward democratic reforms, among them decentralization. However, the stalling of the EU-constitution’s 
ratiﬁcation and the signiﬁcantly reduced budget for the instrument for pre-accession assistance (IPA) calls
into question the EU’s commitment to the region. Strengthening the EU’s presence in Serbia and maintaining 
the prospect of membership is a key for the success of EU conditionality, and thus for democratic reforms to 
continue. 
It is time for the EU to set a clear policy towards the ongoing disputes over the territorial organization of Ser-
bia. The EU Commission has not addressed these problems at all so far. It can be argued that ﬁnding the right
answer to these challenges is of similar importance for Europe’s future security, to that of pressing Serbia to 
cooperate with the Hague Tribunal. The need to adopt a strong and appropriate EU policy on this matter is 
urgent, as Serbia is at this very moment drafting a new constitution.
  
